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rightly commenced more than one suit,
and rightly incurred costs in both, may
rightfully recover the same of the several parties originally liable for the debt
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and costs. Perhaps this should strictly
be limited to costs accruing before satisfaction was received of other parties.
EDMUND H. BEENNTT.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

United States Circuit Court, -Districtof Indiana.
W. G. FARGO, PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN EXPRESS CO., v.
LOUISVILLE, NEW ALBANY AND CHICAGO RAILWAY CO.
For purposes of Federal jurisdiction, a corporation is a citizen of the state creating it, and no averment of the individual citizenship of its members will be permitted.
A joint stock company, under the laws of New York, possessing the right to sue
n the name of its president, who is individually a citizen of New York, and having
various other essential qualities of a corporation, is a citizen of New York for the
purposes of jurisdiction ; and a suit by its president may be sustained in a federal
court, although some of its members are citizens of the same state as the defendant.
It is only by comity that a corporation created by one state can sue in its own
name in another, and the reasons for such comity apply equally to the case of a joint
stock company.

BILL in equity brought by William G. Fargo, a citizen of the
state of New York, individually and as president of the American
Express Company, against the Louisville, New Albany and Chicago
Railway Company for an injunction, and other relief.
The respondents moved to quash for want of jurisdiction.
Isaac Caldwell and
. 1. Trabue, of Louisville, for the
motion.-The American Express Company, not being a corporation, cannot sue as one in its corporate name, or by its president.

Louisville Railroad Co. v. Letson 2 How. 497; Marshall v. B.
& 0. Railroad Co. 16 How. 314; 0. & M. Railroad Co. Y.
W-heeler, 1 Black 286.
All shareholders must, therefore, be citizens of other states than
Indiana: Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 5 Cranch 57; Bank of

U. S. v. JDeveaux, 5 Id. 85; Breithaupt v. Bank of Georgia, 1

Pet. 238 ; Bank of Cumberland v. Willis, 3 Sumn. 472 ; North

River Co. v. H1offman, 5 Johns. Ch. 300; Bank of Vicksburg v.
Slocomb, 14 Pet. 60; Whitney v. Mayo, 15 Ills. 254; Baldwin v
Lawrence, 2 Simon & Stuart 18; Leigh v. Thomas, 2 Vesey.
Vor. XXIX.--67
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Sr. 312; Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch. 267 ; Cameron v.
Meoberts, 3 Wheat. 591.
. S. Roger8, of Buffalo, N. Y., and A. IF. Hendricks for the
the Indiana"
complainant.-There is no want of jurisdiction unless
2 Mason
Randall,
v.
shareholders are indispensable parties: West
7 Otto
Wade,
v.
196: Payne v. Book, 7 Wall. 431; Rotel Co.
17
Lockhart,
13-21; Story's Eq. Pl., sects. 72-100; Horn v.
Wall. 570; Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130.
to
It would be a denial of justice to require all the shareholders
Wallworth
be made parties : Hichens v. Congreve, 4 Russell 562;
7 Beav.
v. Holt, 4 Mylne & Craig 619 ; Richardson v. Hastings,
323; 11 Id. 17.
v.
As to the character of joint stock corporations: Waterbury
158.
Barb.
50
Merchants' Union -Ex. Co.
the resiThe American Express Company, nothwithstanding
jurisdicfederal
of
purpose
the
dences of its shareholders, is, for
438-Barb.
55
Vicker,
Me
v.
tion, a citizen of New York: Fargo
443.
assigned in the bill
GRESHAM, J.-The grounds of jurisdiction

are:
to sue and
1. That the right of the American Express Company
conferred upon
be sued in the name of its president is a franchise
follows it into
it by the legislature of New York, which, by comity,
that the president
states where it is permitted to do business; also,
of New York, and
is a natural person, and a citizen of the state
the defendant is a citizen of the state of Indiana.
president, is
2. That if it be held that the complainant, as such
of New York, then
not entitled to maintain the suit under the laws
behalf individand
name
own
he brings the suit not only in his
behalf of such
in
also
but
ually, as a shareholdr in the company,
the state of
of
citizens
not
of the other numerous shareholders,
and share
suit
the
to
Indiana, as shall come in and be made parties
in the expense thereof.
of the court are
The defendant's objections to the jurisdiction
but a
corporation,
a
that the American Express Company is not
separate
as an entity
mere voluntary association, with no existence
a citizen in the
being
not
that,
members;
its
of
from the existence
with the names of
sense in which a corporation is, it can sue only
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all its associates who, upon the face of the bill, must appear to be
citizens of states other than the state of Indiana; that the New
York statutes, which, it is claimed, authorized this suit to be brought
in its present form, permit the president to sue only when all the
stockholders can sue, and that all the stockholders of this company
could not sue because they are all of the same class, and some of
them are citizens of the same state as defendant; that the laws of
New York, which confer upon this company certain corporate
franchises, have no extra-territorial effect, and that the jurisdiction
of this court is not of comity, but of constitutional right. The
judicial power of the United States is extended by the constitution
to "controversies between citizens of different states," and by the
Judiciary Act jurisdiction is conferred upon the circuit courts of the
United States when "the suit is between a citizen of the state
where the suit is brought and a citizen of another state." It is
now settled that for the purposes of federal jurisdiction corporations
are regarded as citizens of the states where they are created, and
no averment as to the citizenship of the members elsewhere will be
permitted.
Is the American Express Company, which is a joint stock company, organized under the laws of New York, a citizen in the same
sense and for the same purpose ? In chapter 258 of the laws of
1849, of the state of New York, and in subsequent amendatory
acts, joint stock companies may sue and be sued in the name of the
president and treasurer, when the nature of the action is such that
the suit might be maintained by or against all the shareholders.
Such companies are endowed with perpetual succession, dissolution
not resulting from change in membership produced by death br
otherwise. A pending suit by or against the president or treasurer
of the company is not abated by the death, resignation, or removal
of such officers; and a judgment against the president or treasurer,
as such, is not a lien upon their individual property, but execution
is levied upon the property of the company only, the shareholders
being liable individually after an ineffectual effort to thus collect
the .lebt from the company. These are privileges that are not
enj'yed by natural persons or partnerships. While these companies have no common seal, it is difficult, in other respects, to
distinguish them from corporations. They are organized under
general laws, very much as corporations are now generally organized. Their stock is divided up into shares and sold on the stcek
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boards, just as the stock of corporations is divided up and sold.
Corporations are artificial persons, ideal creatures of the state; and
so are New York joint stock companies. It is of no consequence
that in the statutes under which these companies are organized they
are called "1unincorporated associations." In determining what
such institutions really are, regard is to be had to their essential
attributes rather than to any mere name by which they may be
known. If the essential franchises of a corporation are conferred
upon a joint stock company, it is none the less a corporation for
being called something else. Section 3, article 8, of the constitution of New York declares that "the term ' corporation,' as used
in this article, shall be construed to include associations and joiht
stock companies having any of the powers and privileges of cor
porations not possessed by individuals or partnerships, and all
corporations shall have the right to sue, and shall be subject to
being. sued, in all courts, in like cases as natural persons."
It is urged, however, by counsel for the defendant, that the
statute which confers the right upon these companies to sue and be
sued in the name of the president or treasurer, relates to the remedy
only, and that it can have no extra-territorial effect. Experience
demonstrated the usefulness of these institutions in carrying on trade
and business, and convenience required that they should be allowed
to sue and be subject to suit, in the name of an individual who
should represent the companies, as distinct from the individuals
composing them. The right of such companies to sue and of others,
including their own shareholders, to sue them, could not be acquired
by agreement between the associates. In England, by an Act of
Parliament, a public officer is designated to represent the individuals composing joint stock companies in the courts, both as plaintiff
and defendant, and a judgment taken against him, in his representative capacity, .inds only the property of the company. In New
York, where the samelnecessity was felt for a representative of joint
stock companies in litigation, both by and with them, the legislature provided that suits might he brought by and against such companies in the name of the president or treasurer. Aside from considerations of convenience, it would be a practical denial of justice
to hold that such organizations, representing as they do large interests, with numerous and ever-changing shareholders, can sue and
be sued only in the names of all their associates, as in the case of
partnerships.
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It is only by comity that a corporation which has been created
by one state, is permitted to carry on its business in other states,
and there sue in its corporate name; and it is not easy to assign a
reason why the same rule of comity could not apply in favor of joint
stock companies, which, in character, are not unlike corporations.
In 1855 the legislature of Indiana passed an act (1 Davis 466),
relating to express companies. At that time, and ever since, the
express business in this state has been done by foreign companies,
organized as this company was. By this act it is declared, that all
such companies, and clearly foreign companies are contemplated,
before entering on business in any county in this state, shall file
in the clerk's ofice of that county a statement of their membership,
the amount of capital invested in their business, and an agreement
that service of process upon any agent of the company shall be
deemed good service on the company. Here was a recognition by
the state, of the existence of express companies like the American,
with all the privileges which those enjoyed here organized, one
of which was the right to sue in the representative or common
name.
The legislature of Massachusetts passed a statute which imposed
upon each fire, marine and fire and marine insurance company,
incorporated or associated under the laws of any government or
state, other than one of the United States, a tax of 4 per cent.
upon the premiums charged or received on- contracts made in that
With this statute in force, the
state, for insurance of property
state of Massachusetts filed a bill in its Supreme Judicial Court
against the Liverpool and London Life and Fire Insurance Company, to collect a tax of 4 per cent. on its premiums upon contracts
made in Massachusetts, and to restrain the company from doing
further business until the tax was paid. Payment of the tax was
resisted on the ground, that the defendant was an association of
natural persons under certain deeds of settlement and especial acts
of Parliament, "and not a corporation. In these acts of Parliament conferring privileges on the company, it was declared not to
be the intention to make a corporation. The Supreme Court of
Massachusetts gave a decree against the company. In affirming
the case on appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States held
(Lwerpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566), that, as the law
of corporations is understood in this country, the Liverpool and
London Life and Fire Insurance Company was exercising a cor-
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porate franchise in Massachusetts, and that it was liable as a
corporation to pay the tax under the statute of that state.
In the case of Westeott v. Fargo, 61 N. Y. 542, it was held, that
under sect. 3, art. 8, of the constitution of New York, and under
the legislation of that state already alluded to, the president of the
American Express Company was to be deemed a corporation solely
for the purpose of suing and being sued in the courts of that state.
The reasons which induced the Supreme Court to hold, that for the
purpose of federal jurisdiction, corporations are to be regarded as
citizens of the states whose creatures they are, call with equal force
for a similar ruling in favor of joint stock companies which are
organized under the laws of New York. It is no less convenient
for the public than it is for these companies, that they should be
allowed to sue and be sued in the name of the president or treasurer. If they are not allowed the privilege of suing, they cannot
be thus sued. The American Express Company has a capital stock
of $18,000,000, with more than three thousand shareholders. Its
right to sue and its liability to suit in the name of its president or
treasurer, is a franchise conferred upon it by the laws of New York,
which, by comity, should and does follow it into other states; and
William G. Fargo, who brings the suit as president, is a citizen of
New York; and the defendant is an Indiana corporation, and a
citizen of that state. For these reasons, I think the suit is properly
brought, and without deciding other questions which were argued
by counsel, the motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction is overruled.
Unincorporated joint stock companies,
as they exist in the United States, are,
with the exception perhaps of those organized under the statutes of New York,
merely co-partnerships, and, as a general
thing, subject to all the rules governing
that branch of the law. Viers v. Sainet, 13 La. 300; Tenney v. . E. Protectie Union, 37 Vt. 64; Manning v.
Gasharie: 27 Ind. 399; Hedge's Appeal, 63 Penn. St. 274; Tappan v.
Bailey, 4 Met. 535, Bobbins v. Butler,
24 Ill., 387; Babb v. Reed, 5 Rawle
151; Lafond v. Deems, 52 How. Pr. 41 ;
s.c., 1 Abb. . C. 318 ; Wellsv. Gates,
18 Ba-b. 554; Dennis v. Kennedy, 19
Id.

517;

Townsend v.

Goewey,

19

Wend. 428; Cross v. Jackson, 5 Hill
478; Williams v. Bank of Mich., 7
Wend. 539 ; In re Fry, Treas., 4 Phila.
129; Kramer v. Arthurs, 7 Penn. St.
165.
The principal difference between unincorporated joint stock associations and
partnerships, relates to the effect of a
transfer of a member's interest in
the association. In the case of a partnership such a transfer, in the absence of
an agreement to the contrary, works a
dissolution, as does likewise the death of
a partner. In the case of a joint stock
association there is usually no delectus
personm, and a transfer by a member, of
his shares, or the death of a member does
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not dissolve the association; Tyrrell v.
Washburn, 6 Allen 466; Tenney v.
N. E. Prot. Union, 37 Vt. 64. See
Troy Iron and eVailFactory v. Corning,
45 Barb. 231 ; also, Taylor v. Castle,
42 Cal. 367, and Jonesv. Clark, Id. 180,
relating to California mining partnerships, in which there is usually no delecus
person.
As respects joint stock companies organized under the New York statute of
1849 and the acts amendatory thereof,
as was the American Express Co. in
the principal case, the later and more
authoritative and well-considered cases
in that state regard them substantially
as corporations, not having, however, any
common seal, and in which the members
are personably liable: Waterbury v.
Merchants' Union Express Co., 50 Barb.
157; s. c., 3 Abb. Pr. N. S. 163;
Westcottv. Fargo, 61 N. Y. 542; Sandford v. Supervisorsof New York, 15 How.
Pr. 172.
As to what is the status of such companies in other states, there is some diversity of opinion. In Massachusetts it is
held that the statutes under which such
joint stock companies are organized are
local in their operation, as regards remedies for debt against the company; that
in Massachusetts such a company is a
mere partnership, and that its members

may be sued there in the first instance
as partners for such a debt; notwithstanding the provisions of the New York
statute, that no suit shall be maintained in
the demand against the individual members, till judgment has been rendered
against the company, in the name of the
president or treasurer, and execution
thereon returned unsatisfied: Taft v.
Wlard, 106 Mass. 518; s. c., IIl Id.
518; Gott v. Dinsmore, 111 Id. 45.
See, however, Cutler v. Thomas, 25 Vt.
73, where it was said that the liability
of individual members of an unincorporated joint stock company formed in
Canada, growing out of the association,
must be judged of by the laws of Canada, where the association was formed,
and where their place of business was,
though a bill of exchange drawn by them
might be governed by the laws of the
place where it is made payable.
The points decided in the principal
case, and in the Massachusetts cases, are
not identical, and possibly the cases may
stand together, but there has as yet been
so little litigation upon the questions involved in said cases that the law upon
these subjects can hardly be said to be
settled. The reason of the principal
case, however, seems satisfactory, and
such as ought to prevail in future cases.
MARSUALL D. EWELL.
Chicago, June 1881.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
ARCHIBALD LOVE, ET AL. V. E. G. CULVER PAYNE.
to admit the
One partner has no authority to make a contract with a third party,
latter as a member of the firm.
a member
A third person cannot, by buying the interest of one partner, become
of the firm unless all the partners consent.
the memIn a firm consisting of fourteen members owning equal shares, one of
bers, A., acted as president by election of the other members,and had general manparty
agement of the firm business. He contracted with a third party, that if such
a certain sum
would purchase B.'s, one of the fourteen members' interest, and pay
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into the firm's capital, he should hold such share free from mortgage which was then
a lien upon all their property. Afterward the firm property was swept away by
foreclosure of said mortgage, and said third party sued the thirteen other members
for the amount of money so paid into the firm's capital. Reld, he could not maintain his suit, unless the other members had knowledge of A.'s agreement and had
ratified it; but by receiving him as an acting partner, they so far ratified the contract, that such third party became a meniber of the firm.
A party ratifying a contract, is not bound by a separate and distinct part of the
contract, not incident to it or implied, and of which he has no knowledge at the
time of such ratification.
Ratification where there is no express notice, cannot extend beyond an adoption
of the acts of the agent to the extent fairly and reasonably implied from the nature
of the transaction.

was an action against the appellants as members of The
Limited Liability Coal Company, which was the firm name of a
partnership, of which all the appellants were members. The complaint alleged that the said company entered into a contract with
appellee wherein it was agreed that in consideration of appellee's
purchase of the interest of one William Blair, and payment of a
certain sum into the partnership, he should: be admitted as a partner, and that he should receive one-fourteenth interest in said
partnership property free from all liens. The breach assigned was
that he did not receive such interest, but that the firm suffered all the
partnership property to be sold upon a prior mortgage, and that
he really received nothing at all of value.
The appellants were all members of the partnership. John
Elliott was the president and general business manager. The company was engaged in the business of mining and selling coal. William Blair was a member of the firm, and appellant bought his
interest. The appellee did contract with John Elliott that if he,
appellee, would buy the Blair interest, and pay into the partnership
$285; he should receive one-fourteenth interest in the partnership
property free from all liens, and this agreement was made by
Elliott, while assuming to represent the firm. There was a breach
of the contract.
THIS

The opinion of the court was delivered by
ELLIOTT, J.-The second instruction asked by the appellee and
given by the court is as follows:
"If you should find from the evidence that one John Elliott was
* member of the Limnited Liability Coal Company, and was acting
as president of said company, and while so being a member thereof,
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and acting as such president, he made a contract with the plaintiff
on behalf of said company, whereby the plaintiff became a member
of said firm, and in consideration thereof, it was agreed that the
plaintiff should pay into said firm a given amount of money, and
that said company received this plaintiff as a member of said company, and accepted the benefits of said contract, they cannot hold
to the benefits, and at the same time deny the authority of said
Elliott to make the same."
This instruction does not assert, as appellants affirm, that Elliott
had a right to bind the partnership because of this authority derived
from his relationship to his co-partners. If it did, it would be
clearly enough obnoxious to the objections expressed against it.
The proposition is not that Elliott had, as partner, a right to make
the contract, but that because the firm received and appropriated
the benefits resulting from the act of one assuming to represent the
partnership, the partners are liable. The admission of a partner
into a firm is not within the line of partalership business, and Elliott
would have had no authority, as partner, to contract with appellee
that if he would come into the firm the partners would vest in him
a title to one-fourteenth of the partnership property freed from all
liens. It is the elementary rule that a third person cannot, by
buying the interest of one partner, become a member of the firm
unless all the partners consent.
Regarding the instruction as declaring that the partnership was
bound by Elliott's acts, not because he was a member thereof, but
because he professed to act for the firm, and the fruits of his acts
Were received and enjoyed by the partnership, it must still be declared to be erroneous. It is erroneous, because it leaves out of
consideration the essential element of knowledge on the part of the
members of the partnership. The mere coming of appellee into
the firm and the payment of money into the capital stock, would
not of itself charge the firm with knowledge of the agreement that
he should receive one-fourteenth of the property free from all encumbrance. The natural inference, in the absence of notice, would
be the reverse, for the reasonable conclusion would be, that he
stepped into the place of the partner whose share he bought, taking
with it all its burdens and benefits. The instruction broadly asserts
that the partnership would be bound by accepting the benefit of
the contract, and no mention is made of notice or knowledge, on
the part of the partners, of the contract of the president and agent,
VOL. XXIX.-68
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the
to vest in the incoming partner a title to one-fourteenth of
property free from the liens then known to exist. The only benefit
which the partnership got, or could have got, from the appellee,
was the payment of the balance due upon Blair's share of the caphe
ital stock of the partnership. If Blair had remained a member,
than
more
no
did
Payne
could have been compelled to pay it, and
Unless
what his vendor, the retiring partner, was bound to do.
Payne
which
under
the partners had knowledge of the contract
the
because
came into the firm, they cannot be deemed to be bound
to
former paid his proportionate share of the common contribution
retained
the capital stock. The benefits which the partnership
yield as a
were only those which Payne would have been bound to
made
right to admission, and without some knowledge of a contract
partnership
the
to
look
to
right
a
Payne
by a professed agent giving
proto convey to him a perfect title to a part of the partnership
partthe
upon
obligatory
held
be
to
perty, such a contract ought not
retained the
nership. The partners cannot be bound unless they
behalf.
their
in
had,
agent
money after knowledge that a professed
distinct
or
addititional
agreed to give the incoming partner an
the retiring
consideration, from that arising from the sale to him of
firm.
the
of
partner's interest, and his admission as a member
by reand
The appellants, by accepting Payne as a co-partner,
ratify
ceiving into the common fund his money, did undoubtedly
declared
to some extent the acts of Elliott, but not to the extent
acts cannot
by the instruction. The ratification implied from such
made
be so extended as to cover a distinct and independent contract
If
by the agent, and of which the principals had no knowledge.
Payne into the
such a contract was one implied in the admission of
then the
transaction,
a
such
of
firm, or was an ordinary incident
which
upon
contract
the
But
apply.
doctrine of ratification might
purthe
to,
incident
nor
in,
implied
not
appellee seeks a recovery was
By
firm.
the
into
admission
cha.e of Blair's interest and Payne's
fund
common
the
receiving Payne and taking his money into
were utterly
appellants did not ratify a contract of which they
the admisin,
ignorant, and which was not incident to, nor implied
agreement of
sion of Payne as a member of the partnership. The
should
Elliott guaranteeing, as in effect it did, that the appellee
purchase of
receive a perfect title was totally distinct from the
in his stead,
Blair's interest and Payne's admission as a partner
partnership
the
into
coming
Payne's
and could not be implied from
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and paying his money into the common fund. Ratification, where
there is no express notice, cannot extend beyond an adoption of
the acts of the agent to the extent fairly and reasonably implied
from the nature of the transaction, and in this case the nature of
the transaction would have indicated nothing more than that Payne
had taken Blair's place in the firm. To this extent only can it be
said that retaining in the common funds the amount paid by Payne
is a ratification of Elliott's acts.
Other questions are discussed, but as the cause must be remanded
for a new trial, we deem it unnecessary to consider them.
Judgment reversed at costs of appellee.
An assignment, either voluntary, under
a statute, or at common law, by one
partner of all his interest to a third
person, works a dissolution of the partnership: Heath v. Sansom, 4"B. & Ad.
175; 1 Lindley on Partnership 235;
Gordan v. Freeman, 11 Ill. 14 ; Edens v.
Williams, 36 Id. 252; Horton's Appeal,
13 Penn. St. 67 ; Cochran v. Perry, 8
W. & S. 262; Herrick v. Brainard,38
Barb. 574; Buford v. Neely, 2 Dev. Eq.
(N. C.) 481 ; but not if the assignment
is void: Simmons v. Curtis, 41 Me. 376.
The assignment of one partner's interest
as collateral security works a dissolution,
.3arquandv.N. Y. M1anf. Co., 17 Johns.
525. So where part of a firm formed a
body politic, and thereby cast off all
connection with the partnership: The
Sable Company Case, 3 Bland 675; but
where a partner transferred his interest
to his copartners, as collateral security,
with a provision that the partnership
should continue, it was held such an assignment did not put an end to the partnership: Foster v. feidd, 29 Ale. 136.
Giving a mortgage by one partner on his
interest does not work a dissolution until
foreclosure and sale: Receivers v. Godtn, 1 Halst. Ch. 334 ; so giving it to a
copartner: Taft v. Buffum, 14 Pick. 325.
An assignment by one of several partners of all his interest to a co-partner,
and retirement from the firm, operates
as a dissolution of the .-m as to the one

who acquired the share of the party retiring: Sistare v. Cushing, 4 Hun 503.
As to an assignment see McKelvy's
Appeal, 72 Penn. St. 409; Poicer v.
Kirk, 1 Pitts. R. 510 ; Carroll v. Evans,
27 Tex. 266.
A. and B. became partners, A. being
largely indebted ; afterward B. retired,
and A. agreed to carry on the business
on behalf of the creditors of A. After
the dissolution A. died, and it was held
the creditors had no claim for any part of
the profits after A.'s death, or that operated as a dissolution: Crosbie v. Guion,
23 Beav. 519.
A power of attorney given to an agent
by one of the partners to act after his death
in the partnership affair, ceases upon the
death of such partner, and the partnership
is dissolved. McNaughton v. Moore, I
Haywood Eq. & L. (N. C.) 189.
Sale of one partner's interest is a dissolution of the partnership : Whitman
v. Leonard, 3 Pick. 177; Ferrero v.
Buhlmeyer, 34 How. Pr. 34 ; Potter v.
Moses, I R. 1. 430; Spaunhorst v. Link,
46 Mo. 197 ; Mudd v. Bast, 34 Id. 465 ;
Bank v. Andrews, 2 Sneed 535 ; Rogers
Y. Nichols, 20 Tex. 719; Johnson v.
Ames, 11 Pick. 173; Eden v. Williams,
36 Ill. 252 ; Elder v. Hood, 38 Id. 533 ;
Ayer v. Ayer, 41 Vt. 350; Budkingham
v. Hanna, 20 Ind. 110; Reece v. Hoyt,
4 Id. 169.
Although a partnership is entered into
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for a term of years, it is dissolved by the
death of one of the partners : Crawford
v. Hamilton, 3 Mad. 251; Crawshay
v. Ma le, 1 Swanston 509; Pearce v.
Chamberlain, 2 Yes. 33 ; Davis v. Christian, 15 Gratt. 11 ; Remick v. Eu'ing, 42
111. 342 ; White v. Union Ins. Co., 1 N.
& McC. (S. C.) 559; Scholefieldv. Eichelberger, 7 Pet. 586; Burwell v. 3fandeville, 2 How. 560; Griswold v. 1V1addington, 15 Johns. 82; Williamson v.
Wilson, I Bland (Md.) 418; Goodburn
v. Stevens, 5 Gil. (Md.) 1 ; Knapp v.
McBride, 7 Ala. 19 ; Gratz v. Bayard,
11 S. & R. 41 ; Smith's Estate, 33 Leg.
Int. 149; Kottwitz v. Alexander, 34
Tex. 712 : Vilas v. Farwell, 9 Wis.
460; Jenness v. Carleton, 40 Mich. 343 ;
Roberts v. Kelsey, 38 Id. 602 ; .Nelson
v. Hayner, 66 Ills. 487.
The sale on execution of the interest of
one partner ends the partnership. Skipp
v. Horwood, 2 Swanston 586; Heydon
v. Heydon, I Salk. 392; Chaplman v.
Koops, 3 B. & 1. 289 ; Habershon v.
Blurton, 1 DeG. & Sm. 121 ; Aspinall
v. London and Vorthwest Railway Co.,
11 Hare 325 ; W1'aters v. Taylor, 2 V.
& B. 301 ; Davis v. Grove, 2 Rob.
(N. Y.) 136 ; Renton v. Chaplain, 9 N.
J. Eq. 62; Cochran v. Perry, 8 Watts
& S. 266 ; Morrison v. Blodgett, 8 N.
H. 238.
Or by a partner's share being transferred by a bankrupt court: Fox v.
Vanbury, 2 Cowp. 448; Ex parte Williams, 11 Yes. 5 ; Ex parte Smith, 5
Id. 297 ; Ex parte Ruffin, 6 Id. 126 ;
Cawslay v. Collins, 15 Id. 218; Cohen
v. Gibbes, 1 Hill (S. C.) 206 ; Talcott
v. Dudley, 4 Scam. 427; Barstow v.
Adams, 2 Day 70.
. So by marriage of a female partner
(Nerot v. Burnand, 4 Russ. 247), upon
the ground that the husband was entitled
to the possession and management of
his wife's property, and thus a new
party would be introduced into the management of the partnership property
against the will of the other partner.

Since by statutes in many of the statep,
the wife now has absolute power over
her own personal property, this decision
is not the law; and it could no more be
considered that the marriage of a female
partner was a dissolution of the partnership, than she could obtain a dissolution
if a male partner had married. But see
Brown v. Jewett, 18 N. H. 230.
A contract of partnership is founded
on the personal confidence and mutual
trust each partner has in all his copartners, as they are bound in the contract
and as a whole. The withdrawal of one
partner from the firm isa loss to the firm
of the supposed skill and personal supervision he brought to the copartnership.
It is therefore a presumption of law that
a partnership in such a firm is not as
desirable as it was previous to the withdrawal of a member; and this presumption cannot be rebutted by showing that
the retiring member was an actual injury
to the firm so long as lie was a member,
or that a party sought to be introduced
by a sale of one member's interest will
make a better partner than the one retiring. Nor can it be insisted that the
name of the firm is nominally the same,
for this personal confidence rests in each
member, and not in the members collectively, or a majority of them. And
then, when a member dies, the firm is
dissolved because the administrator or
executor has a right to manage his decedent's interest in the partnership, and
thus practically a new member is introduced into the firm without the consent
of the other members; and so in the
case of an assignee in bankruptcy, or
under an insolvent law, or a commonlaw assignment of interest, or profits, or
a sale, either voluntary, or under an
execution.
It is undoubtedly the law that the
principal cannot ratify the act of his
agent in part and reject a part: 77,e
Farmers' Loan 4- Trust Co. v. Walworth,
1 Comst. 447 ; Benedict v. Smith, 10
Paige Ch. 126; Menkens v. Watson, 27
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Mo. 163; Cornwal v. Whlson, I Yes
509; Findley v. Breedlove, 4 Martin
105 ; Hovil v. Pack, 7 East 164; Billon
v. Hyde, I Atk. 126; Smith v. Hodson,
4 T. R. 211 ; Witson v.Poulter, 2 Str.
859 : Ferguson v. Carrington, 9 B. & C.
59; Crans v. Hunter, 28 N. Y. 389;
Krider v. Trustees, 4-c., 31 Iowa 547 ;
Corning v. Southland, 3 Hill 552; Southern Express Co. v. Palmer,48 Geo. 85 ;
Coleman v. Stark, 1 Ore. 115; Widner
v. Lane, 14 Mich. 124 ; Elwell v. Chamberlin, 31 N. Y. 611 ; Crans v. Hunter,
28 Id. 389; Bennett v. Judson, 21 Id. 238;
Starr v. Stark, 2 Sawy. 605; Henderson
v. Cummins, 44 Ill. 325 ; Seagoo v. Mfartin, 6 Heisk. 308; Newal v. Hurlbert, 2
Vt. 351 ; Attwood v. Small, 6 C1. & F.
232 ; Skinnerv. Dayton, 19 Johns. 554;
Odiorne v. Maxy, 13 Mass. 182; New
England Ins. Co. v. De Wolf, 8 Pick. 63;
Kock v. IVilli, 63 Ill. 144; Conklin v.
Leeds, 58 Ill. 178; .filler v. Lea, 35
Ind. 396; Kingsley v. Davis, 104 Mass.
178; Traub v. Milliken, 57 Me. 63;
Leeds v. Ins. Co., 6 Wheat. 565 ; Culver
r. Bylow, 43 Vt. 249; Hunttngton v.
linox, 7 Cash. 371 ; Lock's Appeal, 72
Penn. St. 491.
But a principal ratifying a sale made
Dy his agent does not ratify an unauthorized warranty of which he had no notice:
Haseler v. Lemoyne, 5 C. B. N. S. 530;
Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y. 79 ; Baldwin
v. Burrows, 47 Id. 199 ; but where an
agent sold two mules and took a note
for the purchase price, which his principal ratified by accepting the note, it was
held that he was bound by the warranty
of his agent, although he was ignorant
of it: Cochran v. Chitwood, 59 Ill. 53;
and if be ratifies a sale he ratifies the
acts, however unfair, by which the sale
was brought about: Bennett v. Judson,
21 N. Y. 238 ; Mundorffv. Wickersham,
63 Penn. St. 87 ; and generally the ratification, unless it be made with a full
knowledge of the facts and circumstances
of the case, will not be binding even
though they may have been innocently
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concealed or misrepresented: Bell v.
Cunningham, 3 Pet. 81 ; Brsall v.
Fauntleroy, 10 B. & C. 755; Conn
v. Penn, 1 Pet.C. C. 496 ; Copeland v.
.MfercantileIns. Co., 6 Pick. 198.
Nor can the principal, by ratification,
take the fruits of the transaction and
reject its burdens : Comical v. Wilson,
1 Ves. 509; Clark v. Van Riemsdyk, 9
Cranch 153; Evans v. Buckner, 1 Heisk.
291 ; Toledo, 4-c., Railroad v. Chew, 67
Ill. 378; Chamberlin v. Robertson, 31
Iowa408 ; Woodbury v. Lamed, 5 Minn.
339; Slowcomb v. Cage, 22 La. Ann.
165; .Murray v. Valker, 44 Geo. 58 ;
Blen v. Bear River, 20 Cal. 602 ; W1atson v. Bigelow, 47 Mo. 413 ; Reynolds v.
Davison, 27 Ind. 296 ; Ilolbrook v. Chamberlin, 116 Mass. 155 ; Wright v. Burbank, 64 Penn. St. 247; W1'arden v.
Eichbaum, 3 Grant 42 ; Mforey v. W1'ebb,
65 Barb. 22; Palmerston v. l1uxford, 4
Denio 166 ; Bronson v. Chappell, 12
Wall. 681; Forrestier v. Bordman, 1
Story 43; Cushman v. Loker, 2 Mass.
106; Pouell v. Smith, Law Rep., 14
Eq. 85 ; but receiving part of the proceeds of an irregular sheriff's sale is not
a ratification of the sale: Harris v.
Miner, 28 II. 135.
And where the contract embodied an
agreement that the defendant should set
off a debt due him from the agent, the
principal must take the contract subject
to this agreement. In this case the principal's name was undisclosed, the agent
acting as principal. It does not appear
whether the principal knew of the agreement in regard to the set-off: Ramazotti
v. Bowring, 7C. B. N. S. 851. See as
to set-off against the agent where an undisclosed principal sues, Parkerv. Donaldson, 2 W. & S. 9; Violett v. Powell,
Admin'r, 10 B. Mon. 349; Taintor v.
Prendergast, 3 Hill 72; Mitchell v.
Bristol, 10 Wend. 495; Rathbone v.
Sanders,9 Ind. 217; Gardner v. Allen's
Executor, 6Ala. 189; Iestwood v. Bell,
4 Camp. 349 ; Lime Rock Bank v. Plimpton, 17 Pick. 159; Rabone v. Williams
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7 T. R. 360 n.; George v. Clagett, 7
Id. 359; Merrick's Estate, 5 W. & S.
9 ; Car v. Hinchcliff, 4 B. & C. 547 ;
Semenza v. Brinsley, 18 C. B. N. S.
477 ; Borries v. Inmperial Ottoman Bank,
Law Rcp., 9 C. P. 38; s. c. 43 L. J.
C. P. 3.
An authority given to an agent to purchase and sell goods, and to transact
business with capital furnished by the
principal, and to use his name generally
in the business, does not authorize the
agent to form a copartnership with a third
person. But if the principal knows the
partnership has been formed without au-

thority, he is bound to male known his
dissent within a reasonable time : Wright
v. .Boynton, 37 N. H. 18; the power of
an agent is limited by the authority given
him. The same principal applies to partners. One binds the other so far only as
lie is agent of the others: WMinsldp v.
Bank of UnitedStates, 5 Pet. 560. And
for the purpose of ascertaining the authority or power of one partner to bind
the firm, the object of the formation of
the co-partnersbip, and the usual course
of business in the line of like partnerships
must be considered: Digest of Law of
Part., by Pollock, p. 31.
W. W. THoRNTOW.
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A negotiable note was payable at a bank, and on the day it fell due, the maker
went to the bank, inquired for the note, and not finding it, made a special deposit
of the proper amount to pay it. The bank failed before the holder presented the
note, and he then brought suit against the maker. Held, that the deposit was a
good payment and the plaintiff could not recover.

TIs was an action on a promissory note made by defendant to
the order of one Braden (and duly endorsed), "payable at Allen's
Bunk in the city of Des Moines."
On the day the note was due, the defendant, a resident of Madi" son county, went to Allen's bank to pay the note. The note was
not at the bank, and the defendant deposited the amount required
to pay the same, and took from the bank a deposit ticket in the
following form:

"B. F. ALLEN'S BANK,
To Timothy Horan, Des Moines.
March 21st 1874. Currency to pay note favor William Braden,
and interest, $1512.50."
Some efforts were made by the defendant, by way of correspond
ence through Percival & Hatton, real estate agents at Des Moines,

zo have the note sent to the bank, but they were unavailing.

The
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money thus deposited remained in the bank, and on the 19th day
not
of January 1875, the bank and B. F. Allen failed. It did
on
appear from the evidence what, if anything, would be realized
would
it
that
conceded
be
to
account of said deposit, but appeared
be a total loss.
Cole & Cole, for appellant.
Wright, Hatch & Wright, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROTHROCK, J.-We are required to determine whether the facts
admitted in this case are a defence to an action on the note; or in
other words, where a note is made payable at a bank, and the
.maker deposits the amount necessary to fully discharge it and leaves
the same there, and the bank afterwards fails, is such a deposit a
complete defence to an action by the payee or endorsee against the
maker?
It is well settled, that as to the acceptor of bill of exchange or the
maker of a promissory note, payable at a bank or other specified
place, no presentment or demand need be made at the specified
place, to entitle the holder to maintain an action against the maker
or acceptor. Story on Promissory Notes, sect. 228 ; iDan. on Neg.
Instr., sect. 643 ; 1 Parsons on Notes and Bills 308; Wallace v.
MeConnell, 13 Pet. 136; Fitler v. Beckley, 2 W. & S. 458;
Armistead v. Armistead, 10 Leigh 525.
In Parsons on Notes and Bills, it is said: "The courts in this
country have, with the exception of Louisiana and Indiana, held,
that such acceptances are not conditional; that demand need not
be averred by the plaintiff, but that if the acceptor was at the place
at the time designated, and ready to pay the money, it was matter
of defence to be pleaded on his part, which defence, however, is no
bar to the action, but goes only in reduction of damages and in
prevention of costs."
That the maker of a promissory note and the acceptor of a bill
of exchange, payable at a particular place, are under the same obligation in this respect, and their rights and liabilities are the same,
seems to be well-established. See the authorities above cited.
What are the rights of the parties, however, where the maker of a
note or the acceptor of a bill, deposits the money in the bank desig.
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nated as the place of payment and leaves it there, is another question, upon which there is a surprising paucity of adjudicated cases.
The learned counsel for the respective parties in this cause, have
cited to us no case which is exactly in point. It is true, that in
Wallace v. McConnell, supra, there is language used, from which
it may fairly be implied that in such case, if the holder of the
note or bill should neglect to present it at the specified place, by
reason of which the money should be lost, by the failure of the
bank or the like, this would be a defence; and in Armistead v.
Armistead, supra, it is said: "that the maker, if he is ready at the
time and place to make the payment, may plead the matter in bar
of damages and costs; but he must at the aame time bring the
money into court, which the plaintiff would be entitled to receive.
A further consequence, indeed, might follow, if any loss had been
sustained by his failure to be present, but this must be set up as a
matter of defence. In Fitler v. Beckley, supra, HUSTON, J.,
said: "I incline to the opinion in 13 Pet. 144, as above, that if
the maker or acceptor, where the money is payable at a bank, pays
the money into the bank to the credit of the payee on such note or
bill and leaves it there, it will be a complete discharge, though the
money should be lost by robbery of the bank or otherwise; but
this case does not call for an opinion of the court on this point."
In Nichols v. Pool, 2 Jones L. (N. C.) 23, in discussing the question whether a demand at the place of payment is necessary to maintain an -action, it is said: "The more reasonable construction that
they (the words 'payable,' &c.) were used to convey the idea, that
the parties had made an arrangement, suggested by considerations
of convenience to both sides, according to which the money is to
be paid at a particular place, on a given day; or in other words,
assurance given by the debtor and accepted by the creditor, that
the money will be then and there paid. * * * Considered in this
sense, the effect is, that the creditor does not lose his debt by failing to apply for it at the precise time and place, but may afterwards
recover it; while on the other hand, the debtor may, if in fact he
had the money at the time and place, use that as a defence and
defeat the creditors, by bringing the money into court; or if he
deposited it and it was lost by the failure of the bank, he can put
the loss on the creditor, because of his laches in not calling to get
it."
In Rhodes v. Gent, 5 B. &Ad. 244, language to the same effect is
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therefor. The note was made payable at a bank. These instiritions are depositories of money. They are also collection agencies,
through Which by much the larger part of that branch of the business of the country is transacted. When a note is made payable
at a bank, the parties expect the collection to be made through the
bank. It is true when the defendant deposited the money, the
bank, while holding it, was technically the agent of the depositor.
But the money was deposited for the holder of the note, and it
required no act of the depositor to authorize the bank to pay the
note. "If the customer of a banker accept a bill, and make it
payable at his bankers, that is of itself a sufficient authority to the
banker to apply the customer's funds in paying the bill." Byles
on Bills 151. And if money be deposited for the payment of such
bill or note, the holder may maintain an action against the bank
therefor. Parsons on Com. Law 130. By the very terms of the
contract the defendant agreed to pay the note at the bank. Now,
while it is a general rule that payment of a note or bill should be
made to the actual holder, yet when the parties have contracted
that the payment may be made at a bank, it means that payment
is to be made to the bank. The parties to this contract did not
contemplate that the payee should make a journey from Indianapolis and meet the maker at Allen's bank, and there receive his
money from the hands of the maker and deliver him the note.
a
This court has three times determined that when the maker of
a
at
delivered
be
promissory note, payable in personal property, to
and
specified time and place, makes a tender of the specific articles
sets them apart at the time and place stipulated, and the creditor
is
is not there to receive or refuses to accept the property, the debt
thereby discharged, and the title to the property passes to the
Triplett,
creditor: Games v. Manning, 2 Green 251 ; Williams v.
held in
is
it
while
Now,
36.
Id.
3 Iowa 518 ; State v. Shupe, 16
apart
it
setting
and
these cases that, upon designating the property
said
be
may
it
and
for the creditor, the title of the property passes,
the
holder
the
that by the deposit of the money in the bank for
depositor
the
right of property in the money does not pass, because
may withdraw it, yet this distinction is really not an important
the
one; for, as we have seen, if the money remains on derosit,
if
or
holder of the note may present his note and take the money,
cited the
necessary, maintain an action for it. In one of the cases
be discould
that
if
Now,
brick.
in
note provided for payment
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used in the opinion by one of the judges. An examination of
these cases will show that the question of the rights of the parties,
where there has been actual deposit made by the maker or acceptor,
is not directly involved. They are all cases upon the question as
to whether an action may be maintained without a demand having
been made at the place of payment. The language which we have
quoted is, however, germane to the question which was before the
courts in the several cases involving the rights of the parties to
written instruments of this character, and, if nothing more, serves
to indicate the views of the learned writers of the opinions cited.
In Story on Promissory Notes, sect. 228, this language is used:
"If by such omission or neglect of presentment and demand he
(the maker or acceptor), has sustained any loss or injury, as if the
bill or note were payable at a bank, and the acceptor or maker had
funds there at the time, which have been lost by the failure of the
bank, then and in such case the acceptor or maker will be exonerated from liability to the extent of the loss or injury sustained."
To the same effect see Story on Bills of Exchange, sect. 856; 1
Parsons on Cont. 272-3; 1 Daniel on Neg. Instr. sect. 643.
It is correct, as claimed by counsel for appellee, that these
writers cite no authority which supports the proposition announced
by them. But notwithstanding this, the views of these learned
authors are entitled to proper consideration. On the other hand,
no case has been cited which announces the opposite view from
that given in the above citations. With the limited time at our
disposal, we are unable to make an exhaustive search for authorities, and in this case we have found none which are fairly in point.
In Rowland v. LevI, 14 La. Ann. 223, it was held when a note was
payable at the office of a commercial firm in New Orleans, and at
maturity it was presented by the holder at the place named for
payment and payment refused, and a few days after maturity the
maker remitted part of the same to the mercantile firm to be
applied on the note, that this was no payment. It will be observed
from this statement that the case is wholly different from that at
bar. Here if the note had been presented at maturity it would
have been paid, for the money was in the bank for that very purpose. It would, perhaps, be an unreasonable requirement to hold
that the holder of the note or bill should present it again for payment. We think that, upon principle, the defendant in this case
should be wholly discharged, and we will briefly state our reasons
VoL XXIX.-69
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charged by delivering the brick set aside for the creditor at the time
and place designated, it is difficult to see why, if the note was payable in dollars, it would not equally be a discharge to set apart and
deposit the dollars for the holder of the note.
In our opinion there should have been a judgment for the
defendant.
Judgment reversed.
There is some difference of opinion still
prevalent in England in regard to the
right of action of a payee against the
maker of a promissory note, made payable at a certain time and place, as to
whether presentment and demand at the
place specified is necessary as a condition
precedent to give the holder a right of
action.
At first, in the case of Callaghan v.
Aylett, 2 Camp. 549,it was held that in an
action by the maker of a promissory note,
payable at a certain place, it was necessary that the declaration should aver presentment and demand at the stipulated
place, or it was demurrable. But in Fenton v. Goundry, 13 East 49, this was
denied. The case of Gammon v. Srhmoll,
5 Taunt. (C. P.)344, follows the doctrine
as laid down in Callaghan v. Aylett,
supra; and in the subsequent case of
Sanderson v. Bowes et al., 14 East 500
(K. B.5, the same doctrine was followed
as far as promissory notes were concerned. Yet this latter case does not
absolutely overrule the authority of the
case of Fentonv. Goundry, supra. There
is a material difference between these
two cases in this ; that in the latter case
the bill was made payable at a certain
time and place, while in the former the
note was payable on demand. The doctrine does not seem to be fully settled
in England yet.
There is in this country a surprising
paucity of decisions on this particular
point, considering the vast amount of
commercial transactions of this nature.
There is also in this country as in England and perhaps in this country more

than in the former, a conflict of authority. The decisions of the different state
courts are far from being uniform.
The doctrine generally recognised here
is : that payment to the agent is payment
to the principal, when the agent by his
power, either express or implied, is authorized to receive payment. And even
where the authority of the agent is revoked without the knowledge of the
debtor, and the latter makes payment
without notice of the rovocation of the
authority of the agent, he will be discharged from further liability. Story on
Agency, sec 430; De Valengin's Amrs.
v. Duffy, 14 Peters 282.
One of the earliest cases in support of
the doctrine of the principal case is Crane
v. Halford, Wright 390 (1832, Ohio),
where it was held that payment to a
third person authorized to receive the
money is payment to the principal. But
it was also held, in a subsequent case,
that where a person who was authorized to
receive and apply the money in payment
of the debt, should retain the money and
request an extension of time, that it was
no payment. But in the latter case the
party authorized to receive the money
was the agent of the payor and not of
the payee. Carringtonv. Davis, Wright
735 (1834, Ohio). In the earlier case
of Carley v. Vance, 17 Mass. 389, it
was held, where there was a promise to
pay money at a certain time and place,
and where the defendant was at the time
and place appointed, ready with the
money to discharge the debt, and in the
absence of the promisee, left the money
at the place for the promisee's use, that
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there should have been a profert in curia
to avail the defendant. The conclusions arrived at by the court in that case
do not seem to have been called for by
the facts as stated in the case; in fact
the most of the opinion seems, after reading the statement of facts, to be extrajudicial. Like the principal case, there
was a stipulation in the note as to the
place where the note was payable, as
well as the time when due; also the
maker deposited the money before the
maturity of the note at the place specified
in the note as place of payment. It was
not a question of tender that such a state
of facts would give rise to. The maker
promised to pay the amount of the note
at maturity, at the counting-rooms of
E. L. ; the promisee accepted the note;
and upon the delivery and acceptance of
that obligation, E. L. was constituted
the agent of both parties to the contract; the agent of the maker to receive
the money and apply it in discharge of
his debt, and of the payee to collect the
money and deliver it to him, and to deliver the note or receipt to the promisor.
Upon payment of the money to the agent
of the holder, by the maker of the note,
the maker's part of the contract was performed.
The case of Wallace v. McConnell,
although not a case directly in point,
is nevertheless applicable as far as presentment and demand is concerned. In
that case, the note was made payable
at the Bank of the United States in the
city of Nashville, three years and two
months after date. In May 1836, the
plaintiff began suit on the note, the declaration alleging the non-payment of the
note, although frequent demand had been
made. There was no allegation in the
declaration that a demand had ever been
made at the bank. The defendant had
deposited the money at the bank, and
subsequent to the deposit and prior to
the commencement of the suit on the
note, by the holder, the money so deposited, was attached by some other cred-

itors of the maker. It was held that
presentment and demand at the place of
payment was necessary to entitle the
holder to maintain his action. The court
was further of the opinion that if the note
or bill was made payable at a place other
than the bank, and no deposit could be
made, or the payor should choose to retain his money, an offer at the time and
place to pay the money, would discharge
him from liability for interest and costs.
It will be seen that this opinion is somewhat in conflict with Curley v. Vance,
supra.
The foundation of the same doctrine
contended for in the principal case was
laid in Pennsylvania as early as 1820,
in the case of Peckc v. Harriott, 6S. &R.
146. In that case it was held that when
an agent is authorized by power of attorney to "contract for sale, sell and
convey'" land, and makes an agreement
for the sale of such lands, and for a conveyance upon payment of the purchasemoney and the performance of other conditions, payments made to him after the
agreement and before conveyance will
bind the principal. So payment to a person to whom it was agreed by the vendor, at the time of the sale, that the price
was to be paid, made before the authority of the agentis revoked, will discharge
the purchaser : Marsh v. Laforest, 1
La. Ann. 7. So, too, where the mortgagor made payment to the mortgagee's
agent and inquired for thepapers ; search
was made for the papers, but the agent
said that he could not find them, when
the mortgagor suggested that they might
be at the recorder's office, to which the
agent replied that they probably were,.
held, that although the mortgagees were
afterwards shown to be insolvent at the
time, that there was no legal presumption that the mortgagor knew that the
mortgage was assigned: Foster v. Beds,
21 N. Y. 247. In a later case in New
York, it has also been held that where
the payee of a note leaves it with a bank
for collection the bank becomes his agent
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for the collection of the money, and payment at the bank discharges the maker,
although the bank neglect to transfer
the amount to the payee: Smith v. Essex
County Bank, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 627.
This same doctrine is followed in the
state of MIaine : Ingalls v. Fske, 34 le.
232; and California, in Rhodes v. Hinkley, 6 Cal. 283; Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Id. 265. In the former of
these cases the obligation was made payable at a bank ; the debtor deposited the
amount of the debt with the bank, giving
it to the clerk of the bank, who borrowed
of him the money the next day after it
was deposited for the payment of the
debt ; the amount was not entered on the
books of the bank; but it was held that
the debtor had lost control of the money,
and that the deposit was a legal payment.
The same doctrine is followed in Alabama in the later docisions: Renard
v. Turner, 42 Ala. 117 (1868); Hannah
v. Lankford, 43 Id. 163. This isalso
the law in Missouri; and it is further
held in that state that payment made by
mistake to an agent is payment to the
principal, and discharges the debtor:
McCrary v. Ashbaugh, 44 Mo. 410;
Whelan v. Reilly, 61 Id. 565.
On the other hand it has been held
that where notes have been placed in the
hands of a justice of the peace for collection, on which suit has been comnienced and they are paid before judgment, held, that the payment to the justice
before judgment and after suit is a valid
payment: Johnson v. Hall, 5 Ga. 384.
There are, however, some conflicting decisions mostfy of the states of Georgia
and Louisiana. But the question as
raised in the principal case is not fully
raised in any one of them. We would
simply refer to the cases of Aquilar v.
Bourgeoms, 12 La. Ann. 122; Succession
of O'Keefe, 12 Id. 246 ; Rowlandv. Levy,
14 Id. 223; Smithv. Nettles, 9 Id. 455;
Guilford v. Stacer, 53 Ga. 618; Adams
v. Humphreys, 54 Id. 496; Howard v.
Rice, 54 Id 52. We will not here enter

into a review of these cases, as they, at
the present time, are not followed outside
of those states, and latterly are limited
in their application, doubted, distinguished and qualified in their own states.
When a note or bill is made payable
at a bank, it is usually lodged there for
collection, and the promissor, if he comes
when it is due and pays the money into
the bank, his obligation will be cancelled
and his note delivered to him. It is in
the usual course of business to notify the
maker of a note of the time and place
of payment; but the doctrine that it is
not necessary is grounded upon the principle that the debt is not discharged as to
the promissor by default of presentment
and demand of payment when the debt
becomes due, and at the place where
due. When the maker promises that he
will pay on or before a certain time and
at a certain place, the holder may presume that he (the maker) will have funds
in that depository to meet the note when
due : Story on Promissory Notes, sect.
223-229 andnote I ; United States Bank
v. Smith, 11 Wheat. 171; Wolcott v.
Van Santvoord, 17 Johns. 248 ; Caldwell
v. Cassidy, 8 Cowen 271 ; Watkins v.
Crouch, 5 Leigh 522; Covington v. Comstock, 14 Pet. 43; Barbston v. Gibson,
9 How.'263; Thompson v. Cook, 2 lcLean 122; Silver v. Henderson, 3 Id.
165; Fairchild v. Ogdensburgh Railroad
Co., 15 N. Y. 337.
The plain and unequivocal interpretation of a promise to pay a sum of money
at a place and day certain, is that the
person making the promise will, upon the
day, be at the place named in the promise
with the money; if he does not come, or
if he does come and does not pay the
money, it is not a performance of his
promise. The right of the payee to receive the money does not depend on his
making the demand: Payson v. Whitcomb, 15 Pick. 212, it is absolute by
the very terms of the contract itself.
The principle, at least, seems to be now
well settled in all the states of the

